The global community has faced multiple instances where accidental nuclear war nearly unfolded, with one of the most alarming episodes occurring in January 1995. On that occasion, a Norwegian rocket launch intended for scientific research on the Northern Lights was misinterpreted by Russian early-warning systems as a United States missile attack. This incident brought the world precariously close to nuclear conflict.

Despite the Norwegian government notifying Russian authorities in advance to prevent confusion, the warning failed to reach Russian military personnel. The early-warning alert escalated rapidly, eventually reaching Russian President Boris Yeltsin. At that critical moment, President Yeltsin accessed his ‘nuclear briefcase’, which holds the launch codes, preparing to initiate retaliatory measures. Simultaneously, submarine commanders were placed on high alert, prepared to execute a potential counter-strike. Fortunately, the absence of subsequent missile launches detected by satellites led to the conclusion that the alert was a false alarm.

Instances of close encounters with accidental nuclear conflict are not isolated to this event. In June 1980, a computer chip malfunction caused the US to mistake a simulated nuclear attack for a real one, signalling the launch of 2,200 Soviet missiles. US defence officials only discovered the error before contacting then-President Jimmy Carter for nuclear response authorisation. Russian systems have also experienced frightening false alarms. In September 1983, Soviet early-warning satellites misread sunlight reflecting off clouds as five incoming US ballistic missiles. This was defused by a Soviet officer who doubted the accuracy of the readings and prevented immediate retaliatory action.

Other incidents include a security lapse in 2007 when six nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly loaded onto a US B-52 bomber and transported from North Dakota to Louisiana without proper safeguards. The live weapons remained onboard for 36 hours without detection.

Reflecting on these events, commentators have emphasised the necessity of reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war. One significant suggestion is the removal of nuclear weapons from ‘hair-trigger’ alert statuses that favour rapid launch responses, particularly employed by the United States and Russia. Another recommended change involves ending the US policy of ‘launch-on-warning’, where nuclear weapons could be deployed almost immediately upon the first confirmed indication of an incoming attack. These adjustments could be implemented relatively swiftly and verified internationally, lowering the probability of inadvertent conflict.

Despite the gravity and complexity of nuclear disarmament, some advocates draw parallels with other global challenges, such as climate change, where shifts in awareness and policy have gradually mitigated existential risks. As one commentator noted while discussing the campaign group Global Zero's broad approach to nuclear violence—including connections to systemic issues like white supremacy and patriarchy—there is debate about whether such frameworks resonate universally, especially considering nuclear armaments in countries like North Korea. The commentator cautioned against allowing expansive ideological criteria to restrict participation within disarmament movements, suggesting that an inclusive focus on the prevention of nuclear war, rather than an expectation of achieving global peace, might be more pragmatic.

These historical near-misses and ongoing discussions highlight the persistent dangers posed by nuclear arsenals worldwide and the continuing efforts to manage and reduce these existential risks.

Source: Noah Wire Services