According to the Minute Mirror analysis, the rapid diffusion of artificial intelligence across financial systems has shifted money‑laundering and terrorist‑financing risks from transaction‑centric manipulation to identity‑centric exploitation, posing a structural challenge to Pakistan’s AML/CFT framework as it seeks to demonstrate the durability of recent reforms. The piece warns that generative AI, deepfakes and automated decision tools have weakened document‑based verification and non face‑to‑face onboarding, raising immediate questions about whether existing preventive measures remain adequate. [1]
The FATF has long required jurisdictions to show an active understanding of evolving risks; the Minute Mirror commentary and FATF guidance both underscore that AI‑driven identity fraud directly undermines traditional customer due diligence and demands fresh risk assessments and typologies. According to the FATF guidance, jurisdictions should consider how algorithmic opacity, bias and automation affect detection and inclusion, and update supervisory expectations accordingly. Industry observers note that many banks and regulators still rely on legacy verification protocols that are ill‑suited to voice‑cloning and synthetic‑document tools. [1][4][3]
Beyond identity fraud, the Minute Mirror and IMF analyses identify a new generation of laundering techniques in which criminals use AI to automate transaction structuring, probe controls and adapt patterns to evade static rule‑based monitoring. This evolution raises effectiveness concerns under FATF Immediate Outcomes that measure not only the existence of controls but whether they work in practice; the risk is that technically compliant systems will fail to achieve operational results. Supervisory authorities therefore face pressure to move from checkbox supervision to outcome‑oriented testing and technology‑aware oversight. [1][3][4]
Virtual assets amplify these challenges. The FATF and Dawn reporting warn that cross‑border, high‑speed and decentralised virtual asset ecosystems, especially where anonymity‑enhancing tools and decentralised finance protocols are combined with AI automation, complicate tracing and attribution. Pakistan’s ongoing drive to formalise a licensing and registration regime for virtual asset service providers intersects with these risks; regulators must align any new framework with FATF Recommendation 15 and the Travel Rule to avoid regulatory gaps that can be exploited internationally. [1][2][5]
Terrorist financing adds a distinct dimension: FATF and domestic analyses highlight how extremist networks deploy AI‑generated content to impersonate legitimate actors and solicit funds through informal payment channels and virtual assets. The Minute Mirror commentary stresses the relevance of Immediate Outcome 9 in ensuring jurisdictions can identify and timely disrupt such schemes, while international reporting points to growing use of stablecoins and other VAs by diverse illicit actors, which demands urgent mitigation. [1][2]
The governance of AI within compliance functions emerges as a supervisory priority. FATF guidance and the Minute Mirror note that poorly governed, opaque models introduce accountability gaps and may produce biased or unexplained decisions; prudential and AML supervisors should require documented model governance, human oversight for high‑impact decisions and stress testing of controls against AI‑enabled typologies. Regulators should also provide clear guidance to support firms’ controlled innovation, including regulatory sandboxes for testing analytics and transaction monitoring enhancements. [4][1]
Pakistan’s particular vulnerabilities stem from the rapid expansion of digital financial services and the nation’s recent exit from enhanced monitoring. Financial inclusion gains from mobile wallets, branchless banking and fintech are important but, as the Minute Mirror and Dawn reporting warn, they must be matched by proportionate risk mitigation. Observers have flagged that without stronger law‑enforcement capacity, judicial expertise on financial crime and sustained international cooperation, progress on FATF commitments could be fragile. [1][6][7]
Policy recommendations flowing from these analyses are consistent: require VASPs to implement enhanced due diligence for remote onboarding, continuous transaction monitoring attuned to AI‑driven behaviours, and governance arrangements that ensure accountability for compliance technologies; expect banks and payment providers to invest in advanced analytics, staff training and coordinated internal controls; and embed AI risk into Pakistan’s national AML/CFT strategy with cross‑agency coordination and public‑sector analytic capacity building. Such measures would better align Pakistan with FATF expectations and strengthen effectiveness across multiple Immediate Outcomes. [1][2][4][5]
The rise of AI and deepfake technologies represents a durable change in the financial‑crime landscape rather than a transient threat. Pakistan’s ability to adapt regulation, supervision and institutional capacity to address identity‑centric fraud, automation of laundering and VA‑related risks will be central to sustaining financial integrity, preserving international confidence and securing the economic benefits of digital finance. [1]
📌 Reference Map:
##Reference Map:
- [1] (Minute Mirror) - Paragraph 1, Paragraph 2, Paragraph 3, Paragraph 5, Paragraph 6, Paragraph 7, Paragraph 8, Paragraph 9
- [4] (Financial Action Task Force guidance) - Paragraph 2, Paragraph 3, Paragraph 6, Paragraph 8
- [3] (IMF, Finance & Development) - Paragraph 2, Paragraph 3
- [2] (Dawn) - Paragraph 4, Paragraph 5, Paragraph 8
- [5] (Wikipedia: Pakistan Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority) - Paragraph 4, Paragraph 8
- [6] (Dawn) - Paragraph 7
- [7] (Wikipedia: FATF grey list) - Paragraph 7
Source: Noah Wire Services